成人直播

• 2020/05/12

  Rational Bubbles and Middlemen

  Economics Seminar (2020-05)Topic: Rational Bubbles and MiddlemenSpeaker: Makoto Watanabe，Vrije Universit AmsterdamTime: May 12th, Tuesday. 14:30p.m. - 16:00p.m.Location: Microsoft Teams Online Conference RoomAbstract:This paper develops a nite-period model of rational bubbles where trade of an asset takes place through a chain of middlemen. We show that there exists a unique equilibrium, and a...

• 2020/04/24

  Toxic Assets and Market Freezes

  Economics Seminar (2020-04)Topic: Toxic Assets and Market FreezesSpeaker: Randall Wright, University of Wisconsin- MadisonTime: April 24, Friday. 09:00a.m. - 10:30a.m.Location: Microsoft Teams Online Conference RoomAbstract:We study economies where some assets are toxic -i.e., they have negative returns - but still have positive prices because they provide liquidity as payment instruments or as...

• 2020/03/27

  Lending Relationships and Optimal Monetary Policy (Joint with Russell Wong an...

  Economics Seminar (2020-02)Topic: Lending Relationships and Optimal Monetary Policy (Joint with Russell Wong and Cathy Zhang)Speaker: Guillaume Rocheteau, University of California, IrvineTime: March 27, Friday. 09:00a.m. - 11:00a.m. Location: Microsoft Teams Online Conference RoomAbstract:We construct and calibrate a monetary model of corporatefinance with endogenous formation of lending relat...

• 2020/03/13

  “Golden Ages”: A Tale of Two Labor Markets

  Economics Seminar (2020-01)Topic: “Golden Ages”: A Tale of Two Labor MarketsSpeaker: Hanming Fang, University of PennsylvaniaTime: Friday, March 13th, 08:30-10:00a.m. Location: Microsoft Teams Online Conference RoomAbstract：We document stark differences in the labor market outcomes between the U.S. and China, the largest two economies in the world, during the past 30 years. (1) The peak age ...

• 2019/12/03

  Robust Binary Voting

  Economics Seminar（2019-20）Topic: Robust Binary VotingSpeaker: Qinggong Wu, Hong Kong University of Science and TechnologyTime: Tuesday,Dec.3, 13:30-15:00 Location: Room 217, Guanghua Building 2 Abstract:In this paper, we study a new robustness concept in mechanism design with interdependent values: interim dominant strategy incentive compatibility (IDSIC). It requires each agent to have an in...