EconomicsSeminar（2018-13）

Topic: Endogenous Labor Market Cycles

Speaker: Cheng WANG, Fudan University

Time: Friday, Sept.21, 13:00-15:30p.m

Place: Room 217, GuanghuaBuilding 2

Abstract:

This paper shows that in a perfectly stationary physical environment of the labor market, moral hazard and competition in long-term contracts can generate cycles in the tightness of the market, which in turn may induce job creation and destruction, and two period or much longer cycles in employment and output. We claim that the model may shed light on the unemployment volatility puzzle which has inspired many discussions in the literature.

Introduction:

王城，复旦大学经济学院教授。1984年复旦大学数学系本科毕业，1994年获加拿大西安大略大学经济学博士学位。曾任美国卡内基梅隆大学（Carnegie Mellon University）商学院助理教授和副教授，爱荷华州立大学（Iowa State University）经济学副教授和教授。过去二十多年致力于宏观经济学与动态合约理论的研究，研究课题涵盖宏观金融、劳动力市场理论与政策、失业保险、经理人薪酬、动态合约基础理论等领域。研究成果在American Economic Review, Review of Economic Studies, Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of Monetary Economics, International Economic Review, Review of Economic Dynamics等经济学期刊发表。作为动态合约理论比较早的研究者之一，其研究工作对这一经济学重要文献的发展及其在宏观经济学中的应用作出了贡献。他的最新研究兴趣是动态经济关系的最优终止问题及其在劳动力及金融市场模型中的应用。

Your participation is warmly welcomed!