Economics Seminar（2014-30）

Topic:Reputation on Social Media

Speaker: Cheng Sun
Affiliation: Princeton University

Time:Friday, 19 December. 13:00-14:30pm
Location: Room 217, Guanghua Building 2

Abstract：

This paper develops a reputation game in which a biased but informed expert makes a statement to attract audiences. The biased expert has an ideological incentive to distort his information as well as having a reputation concern. The expert knows that his expertise may vary in different topics, while the audiences cannot identify such differences. The biased expert is more likely to announce his favorite message when he knows less about it. Moreover, the biased expert is less willing to lie when the audiences have better outside options, and such improvements in outside options may benefit both the expert and the audiences. In reputation games like this, the expert’s type will be revealed and the size of the followers will almost vanish in the long run.