报告人：Jiahua Che, Chinese University of Hong Kong
时间：2:00-3:30pm, May 8
地点：成人直播新楼217教室
Abstract:
There are three signature features of autocracies. First, there is wide variety across autocracies in terms of economic performance: some do much better and some much worse than democracies. Second, economic performance within a given autocracy is more sensitive to leader quality, resulting in higher volatility. Third, all autocracies, good or bad, tend to have weaker civil societies than democracies do. We attribute these features to the core of the autocratic political institution: incumbent leader selects future leader as opposed to citizens at large selecting future leader under democracy. We deliver our analysis in an overlapping-generation model where two kinds of dynamic free-riding problem arise. The first arises among different generations of citizens in implementing far-sighted policies. Political leaders come in two types, good ones aim to correct this first kind of dynamic free-riding problem, while bad ones do not care and aim to steal public assets. Both types need a weak civil society to achieve their goals, but a second dynamic free-riding problem arise among different leaders when it comes to suppressing the civil society. The autocratic leader-selection mechanism helps resolve this second dynamic free-riding problem, results in a continuously weakened civil society, which in turn generates more variation both among autocracies and within a given autocracy. A rich set of comparative statics is offered.
用户登录
成人直播成人直播